Henry J. Brajkovic
“Everyone’s Wild About Harry” was the title of an article in Newsweek (March 24, 1975), which indicated a resurgence of interest in Harry S. Truman. Why this new interest? Could it be a post-Watergate reaction? Even the rock group called Chicago cane up with a hit tune, “Harry Truman”, Which had these lyrics:
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“America needs you, Harry Truman,
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Harry, could you please come home?
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Things are lookin’ bad.
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I know you would be mad
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To see what kind of men
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Prevail upon the land you love.”
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(Laminations Music, Big Elk Music and CBS, Inc., 1975)
It appears that Truman’s current appeal is more a matter of style than of substance. What sticks in the mind is Truman’s bluntness and utter lack of pretension. It’s been reported that “All across America, in fact, people are hailing the 33rd president as one of the last American heroes.” How this image squares with the historical record is the underlying question of this curriculum unit.
This unit is for the high school U. S. History course. It could cover one or two weeks of classroom work, depending upon how much detail a teacher would like to stress. The unit will look into the problem of decision-making: how foreign policy is made and who makes the decisions.
From Truman’s point of view, it was never a question that the president was the decision-maker. He kept a plaque on his desk which proclaimed “The buck stops here.” He would listen to the recommendations of his advisers and then make his decision. Truman had to face many crises and make quick decisions. This was especially true after he took over the presidency upon the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt when urgent situations in the concluding months of World War II demanded immediate action.
Truman epitomized the American democratic ideal: that anybody could become president of the United States. He was an average American without a college degree. However, many of his advisers were Ivy League graduates and professional diplomats.
In the early days of Truman’s presidency the war in Europe was coming to an end. From the beginning Truman acted differently. While Franklin D. Roosevelt was a patrician and took time to make decisions, Truman was plain and folksy and seemed to make quick decisions, which delighted the military and civilian high-ranking officials.
This unit will examine some of the problems Truman faced and will look into the role the president and his advisers had in the decision-making process.
The Decision to Drop the Atom Bomb
Some students might wonder: Why did we build the atom bomb? Why did we use the bomb? Could it have been possible to win the war without using the atom bomb? How did this all come about?
The main motive of American scientists to urge the development of nuclear power for use in the war was their conviction that the German scientists were working on an atomic bomb and that the Germans would have no scruples in using it. They were proven right when Hitler started using new secret weapons in June 1944: the V1 and the V2, pilotless jet-propelled rockets that bombarded England. Hitler warned the Allies of more secret weapons being developed. This was not the first time that he boasted about secret weapons. The Allies knew of the German attempts to build the atom bomb. A factory in Norway where the “heavy water” was produced for the manufacture of nuclear materials was bombed.
Truman also had to take into consideration what the Joint Chiefs had told him about their plans to invade Japan and end the war. They informed him that a landing attack on Kyushu Island, one of the Home Islands of Japan, would probably cost about 31,000 American lives during the first 30 days of the invasion. General George C. Marshall reported that American air and sea power had reduced Japanese shipping south of Korea and would eventually stop it altogether. We were committed to a strategy of strangulation of their war economy by bombardment and a naval and air blockade. General Marshall’s belief was that the Japanese might capitulate if the situation became hopeless with:
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the destruction wrought by the bombardment and the blockade
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an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands
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the entry of Russia into war against Japan
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The Joint Chiefs planned an invasion of Kyushu Island for November 1, 1945.
For the Interim Committee on the Use of the Bomb, composed of scientists, it was a foregone conclusion that the bomb would be used. The Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson claimed that this committee recommended that the bomb be used as soon as possible on a Japanese military installation or war plant surrounded by houses most susceptible to damage, and that it should be used without a prior warning.
A wartime poll, by secret ballot, on July 12, 1945, of 150 scientists at the University of Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory showed the following results:
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15% favored full military use of the atomic bomb 46% favored limited use
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26% wanted an experimental demonstration before military use
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13% preferred to avoid any military use.
Unfortunately, the results of the poll never reached the men in power because it was buried among other documents.
John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, recorded that the suggestion to warn the Japanese that the United States had an atom bomb was opposed by Stimson and the Joint Chiefs because they feared that the bomb might be unsuccessful. We only had two atom bombs. If one of the bombs were used as a demonstration on an uninhabited island for the benefit of a Japanese delegation and it turned out to be a dud, it would have been a psychological setback for the United States. The Japanese would have concluded that we had no new weapon. The Japanese militarists would have prevailed over the pacifist Japanese officials to continue fighting, thus prolonging the war and raising our number of casualties.
Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy, believed that we should give a warning two or three days in advance of using the atom bomb. He felt that the Japanese should be contacted for unconditional surrender.
The general impression is that Truman made the decision to drop the bomb. In reality his decision was not Whether to drop the bomb but rather
when
to drop it. Truman never lost any sleep over his decision. He believed that the bomb ended the war, and that an invasion of Japan would have resulted in a half-million soldiers on both sides killed and a million more maimed for life.
Also, James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State in 1945, advocated the use of the bomb for other reasons. He felt that the completion and the testing of it prior to the Potsdam Conference and the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Paris would give him leverage in negotiations with the Russians. Byrnes believed that the Russians were going to declare war on Japan in early August of 1945, and he wanted to keep Russia out of Manchuria and Northern China. This would be averted by the dropping of the bomb on Japan, forcing an immediate surrender of Japan to the United States only. In any event, Russia entered the war against Japan and seized control of Manchuria, North Korea and parts of Northern China. Stimson also advised Truman in April of 1945 to use the bomb for its impact on relations with Russia. Byrnes’ attitude was antiRussian and it contributed toward a state of tension in our relations with Russia, which later developed into the Cold War.
It is interesting to note that the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders showed that Japan would have surrendered in all probability prior to November 1, 1945, and certainly prior to December 31, 1945, even if the atomic bomb had not been dropped, even if no invasion had been planned, or even if Russia had not entered the war.
Truman’s Decision on Korea
When teaching about the U. S. Constitution the question comes up as to who has the power to declare war. Article 1, Section 8 states that Congress has the power to declare war. This power has been given to Congress in order to make the presidential powers weaker. In order for a president to make the right decision it is absolutely essential for him to have adequate information and advice. It is the president’s responsibility alone to give directions. Once a president makes his decision in an emergency situation, he then goes to Congress asking for a declaration of war.
When North Korea attacked South Korea on June 24, 1950, the State Department officials advised Secretary of State Dean Acheson to call for a meeting of the Security Council of the United Nations. Acheson telephoned Truman telling him about the news and the suggestion and Truman agreed to it. Truman had to base his decision on recommendations of the State and Defense Departments.
A meeting was called at the Blair House and Truman asked each person to state whether he agreed or disagreed with the following three recommendations:
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to evacuate Americans from the Seoul area
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to order General MacArthur to air-drop supplies to the South Korean forces.
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to order the 7th Pacific fleet to move north from the Philippines to the Formosa Straits
at once
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All present at the meeting agreed to the recommendations. Truman wanted the news about the 7th fleet’s movement withheld from the public until the fleet was in position. Later, Truman gave all the credit for making the decision to stop the North Korean invasion to Dean Acheson.
Avoiding World War III in Korea
Students sometimes question: “Why didn’t the United States have a full-scale war with China, since we were fighting the Chinese in Korea. For what reason did Truman limit the war to the Korean peninsula? Why did Truman send the 7th Pacific fleet into the Formosa Straits when the war was being fought in Korea?
Truman placed constraint on all his actions in Korea because he wanted to avoid war with Communist China. It was necessary to send the 7th Pacific fleet into the Formosa Strait to prevent Chiang Kai-shek from sending his troops to the Chinese mainland and to prevent the Communist Chinese from attacking Formosa. Truman also rejected Chiang Kai-shek’s offer of 30,000 Nationalist soldiers for Korean duty. Why did Truman reject this offer of help? He was convinced that it would drag the United States into a major war on the Asiatic mainland, and would draw the Soviet Union into the war to help Communist China against the U.S. Truman agreed with General Omar Bradley that expanding the Korean War would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.
Truman believed that the Soviet Union trained and equipped the North Koreans for aggression. Dean Acheson and everyone else around Truman were convinced that the North Korean decision to move troops across the 38th parallel into South Korea had come from the Kremlin, and that Stalin was testing American resolution and nerve. How did the military commanders in the field feel about this decision?
General MacArthur had different ideas. He believed that all available military power of the Chinese nation, with logistic support from the Soviet Union, was committed to a maximum effort against our forces. He felt he was operating under restrictions of not fully utilizing U. S. naval and air potential and not being allowed to cross the Yalu River into China. He also declared that it was a mistake to prevent Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist troops from attacking the Chinese mainland.
General MacArthur voiced these views publicly, a move that generated a lot of controversy. Truman felt that if the United States followed MacArthur’s ideas, it would lead to a general war. A war with China would please the Soviet Union since it would entangle us in a vast conflict and would surely weaken out influence all over the world, especially in Europe. Therefore, Truman decided to fire General MacArthur. With this action, he reasserted the powers of a civilian president over the military. Truman was the Commander-in-Chief. Truman defended his firing of General MacArthur by saying that the cause of world peace was more important than any individual. He disregarded all the attacks made upon him for this decision because he felt that he was doing what was best for America.
