In March of 1942, Congress passed legislation that would allow the president the power to restrict the movement or residence of certain people for the sake of national security. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, an attack on the West Coast was greatly feared. There was growing anti-Japanese sentiment and the loyalty of residents of Japanese ancestry, both alien and citizen, was under great suspicion. There were tens of thousands of Japanese -Americans living along the coast, and people feared that they were strategically placed to aid in an attack from within. For the sake of national security, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. This order declared that “the successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and national-defense utilities.” This order was applied to Japanese-Americans and restrictions ranged from curfews placed on them only, and their forced removal to relocation centers that were much further inland.
The Korematsu case came as a result of Exclusion Order No. 34. This order issued by General Dewitt, in May of 1942, barred everyone of Japanese descent from the military area of San Leandro, California. Because he refused to leave this military area where he lived, Korematsu, an American citizen, was convicted of violating an act of Congress. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and Mr. Korematsu appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld Korematsu’s conviction. The court felt that Mr. Korematsu was not being denied rights because of racial prejudice, but his and the rights of others with his ancestry had to be suspended for the greater good, national security. The court stated that there were numerous Japanese-American citizens who still had allegiance to Japan and that it was not possible to quickly and effectively establish which members of the community had loyalties that lined up with the U.S. It was therefore deemed necessary to impose executive orders to protect America.
Justice Black’s majority opinion referred to a legal precedent set by an earlier case, Hirabayashi v. United States. In this case, Mr. Hirabayashi challenged the 1942 Act as an unconstitutional delegation of power. He also argued that the curfew orders and others were beyond the war powers of Congress and the President. Lastly, he contended that because the curfew order only applied to those of Japanese ancestry, the U.S. was in violation of the Constitution’s prohibition of discrimination based solely on race. His ancestry could not be an indicator of his loyalty or lack of loyalty to the U.S. In the Hirabayashi case, the court also found in favor of the United States. The curfew order was upheld as a necessary step to prevent espionage and sabotage in areas threatened to be attacked by the Japanese. Justice Black said:
In the light of the principles we announced in the Hirabayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did. True, exclusion from the area in which one’s home is located is a far greater deprivation than constant confinement to the home from 8 p.m. to 6 a. m. Nothing short of apprehension by the proper military authorities of the gravest imminent danger to the public safety can constitutionally justify either. But exclusion from a threatened area, no less than curfew, has a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage. (4)
In the cases presented, the Constitutional rights of Japanese-Americans were suspended because there appeared to be a threat to national security. Was this fair? Should rights ever be suspended? What would happen if we were ever at war with Russia, Israel or Africa? Should the rights of American citizens with those ancestries be suspended for fear of sabotage from within? Let the children decide.
