Henry J. Brajkovic
When Franklin D. Roosevelt became President his attention was diverted from the international problems England and France had with Germany because domestic problems were more immediate and important to him.
Former President Hoover’s call for an International Economic Conference to be held in London in 1933 was wrecked by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s refusal to agree to peg the value of the U.S. dollar to any other currency because he felt it would hurt his efforts to raise American farm prices.
I. The Good Neighbor Policy and Pan-Americanism
Franklin D. Roosevelt advocated a new direction on foreign affairs by his Good Neighbor Policy. Actually, it was not a new direction since Hoover had started a policy of cooperation with the Latin American countries. So far as the Latin American countries were concerned, their governments were pleased by his abandonment of Theodore Roosevelt’s interventionism. Secretary Cordell Hull agreed to the idea of cooperation when he visited the Pan American Conference in Montevido in Uruguay in 1933. This policy of nonintervention was carried out by:
(a)
|
the American withdrawal of marines from Haiti,
|
(b)
|
a new treaty signed with Cuba whereby the Platt Amendment was nullified,
|
(c)
|
the U.S. giving up the right to police the Panama government in 1939,
|
(d)
|
the U.S. giving up control of finances of the Dominican Republic,
|
(e)
|
and only making mild protests to the Mexican government when it took over oil and farmlands owned by American citizens, thereby repudiating dollar diplomacy.
|
The students should become aware that the Good Neighbor Policy was a continuous policy and not a campaign slogan. In 1936, when F.D. Roosevelt attended the Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires, Argentina, he showed that the United States was willing to stop dominating weaker nations by its adherence to the “Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation,” and that the Latin American countries would be treated as equals.
Sometimes students feel that treaties are just pieces of paper signed by dignitaries, and then forgotten. A way of showing the students that this is not so all the time is to point out that the above treaty brought about concrete results:
(a)
|
A government cultural exchange program was instituted, supplemented by local and private agencies.
|
(b)
|
Hollywood film makers agreed to change the image of Latins in their films.
|
(c)
|
Time
Magazine started publishing in Spanish and Portuguese.
|
Following Hoover’s example, F.D. Roosevelt supplanted economic nationalism with economic cooperation:
(a)
|
Reciprocity treaties were made with 15 different Latin American countries.
|
(b)
|
U.S. government capital gradually replaced private investments through the Export-Import Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department.
|
(c)
|
F.D. Roosevelt increased, nearly by double, the annual payments to Panama for canal rights.
|
After war broke out in Europe in 1939, the earlier Declaration of Lima was strengthened at a conference in Panama to secure “the sovereignty, political independence of the American states” and set up the machinery to make the declaration effective, with Latin American countries as coequal partners. This made the Monroe Doctrine more forceful by changing it from a unilateral U.S. doctrine to a multilateral Pan-American doctrine.
II. The stalemate between an internationalist President and an isolationist Congress
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s recognition of the U.S.S.R. was a new departure from previous administrations. The Roosevelt-Litvinov pact did not bring about a great increase in trade with the U.S.S.R. though Franklin D. Roosevelt had hoped to alleviate the Depression through increased foreign trade. This pact did not work out well for the U.S. because the Russians never offered a debt settlement satisfactory to American negotiators, nor did they buy much American goods. Nor did the Russians refrain from continuing their support of subversive agents in our country.
The earlier Neutrality Acts dealt with war among nations and did not deal with civil wars. The new Neutrality Act of 1937 hurt the Loyalist government in Spain. According to Robert A. Divine, this Neutrality Act of 1937 made U.S. “a silent accomplice of Hitler” since Germany was not hampered in sending supplies to General Franco’s rebel forces, while the United States was hampered in sending supplies to the Loyalist government. To the Germans, this evidence of American isolation simply reinforced the Anglo-French appeasement policies. This Act also did not help the Chinese who were fighting against the Japanese invasion.
However, Roosevelt tried to arouse the American public with his “Quarantine” speech in Chicago in 1937. He proposed to quarantine aggressors by joining other powers in such an effort. Isolationist feelings were still too strong among the American people and he was, therefore, unsuccessful.
The German persecution of German-Jews during 1934-1936 brought loud protestations by different Jewish-American organizations, including a mock trial at Madison Square Garden in March, 1934. The German ambassador protested, but Secretary of State Cordell Hull could not stop the rally. There was no enthusiasm for the idea to bring German-Jews to America because the economics of the Depression governed official mentality in 1933. With high unemployment Roosevelt’s government upheld Hoover’s executive order not to admit to the United States persons “who were likely to become public charges.” Franklin D. Roosevelt’s government refused to give even a “token” amount of contributions to the League of Nations’ High Commission for Refugees (Jewish and others) coming from Germany until other countries made contributions first. The scheme of Hjalmar Schacht, president of the German Reichsbank, to use one-quarter of the German-Jewish assets to finance purchases of German machinery after the Jews settled in the U.S., fell through. According to Arnold Offner, “conceivably Germany’s Jews might have been spared future destruction had this plan been implemented.” Later in 1938 the German foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, said that the question of German-Jews was “an internal German problem and was not subject to discussion” at the Evian Conference.
The deliberate Japanese attack upon the American gunboat
Panay
in China left Americans unmoved. The majority of Americans thought that the United States should get out of China completely. The Japanese were willing to pay for the damages. In 1939, Roosevelt supplied Nationalist China with some supplies because Japan had not declared war on China even though it was fighting a war. This lack of declaration of war of the part of Japan provided a loophole in the Neutrality Act so Roosevelt was able to send aid to China. This technicality in the Neutrality Act made it possible for Japan to fulfill 90% of its needs for copper and metal scrap by buying it from the United States. The cash-and-carry provision that Bernard Baruch had earlier proposed for the Neutrality Act of 1937 helped Japan but not China. Japan had a great merchant fleet and the necessary cash for American resources.
III. America’s gradual involvement in the global conflict
Finally, the realization came to Roosevelt that the expansionist policies of Japan in Asia and Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria in March 1938 required stronger armed forces for the U.S. Congress passed a naval expansion bill for the building of a two-ocean Navy in May 1938.
The effect of Germany’s attack on Poland in 1939 brought about a declaration by President Roosevelt “to be neutral in deed if not in thought.” It became evident that the Neutrality Acts favored Germany since Germany had no need to buy armaments, while Britain and France had great needs. He urged Congress to repeal the arms embargo. His appeal was finally answered by Congress with the provision that England and France supply the ships and cash for armaments. Title to all exports were to be transferred
before
the goods left the U.S. With such provisions in the revision of the Neutrality Act, Americans felt there was no risk of getting involved in the European war. Franklin D. Roosevelt never hinted that his proposals for the revision of the Neutrality Act would link the United States with England and France against Germany.
*Even while observing the provisions of the Neutrality Acts, Roosevelt began in 1939 to prepare for eventual participation in the war on the side of the western powers.
*After the Neutrality Act of 1939 was signed by President Roosevelt, he proclaimed the North Atlantic a combat zone. In the first few months of war between the Allies (England and France) and Germany (September 1939), Franklin D. Roosevelt made every possible effort to insulate the United States from the European conflict.
To the French Premier Reynaud’s request for American aid, Roosevelt could only answer that the U.S. could not give any aid. He stated that Congress could only declare war.
Soon afterwards Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Congress for a five-fold increase of the Navy. In May 1940, Churchill asked for 40 or 50 overage destroyers. By September 1940 a destroyers-for-bases agreement was made; thereby the U.S. openly declared its support of England in the war against Germany. This act marked the end of American neutrality.
In June 1940 Japan entered the fourth year of war against China. Japan sealed Chiang Kai-shek’s forces by having the British close the Burma Road, and forced the French (through the Vichy government) to ban military shipments via trains through Indo-China.
Only the United States stood between Japan and its dominance of all Asia. President Roosevelt ordered the Pacific fleet to have maneuvers off Hawaii and ordered the fleet to remain indefinitely nearby. He also transferred the fleet’s base from California to Hawaii.
The National Defense Act of 1940 gave the President the right to place embargoes on any materials deemed essential to national defense. When Morgenthay and Stimson persuaded Franklin D. Roosevelt to place oil and scrap iron on the list of materials essential for national security, Sumner Welles protested. The President then limited the embargo to aviation gasoline and only the highest grade of scrap iron. This made for a major departure in American foreign policy.
The embargo of materials for Japan came too late since Japan decided to carry out its plan for the New Order in Asia, i.e., conquest of Southeast Asia. A Tripartite Pact was made between Germany, Italy and Japan. Germany wanted to prevent American entry into the war, while Japan wanted to frighten the U.S. with the prospect of a possible two-ocean war.
The 1940 election campaign in the U.S. was on. Roosevelt made a statement, “Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign war.” However, the following comment was not part of his speech: “Of course, we’ll fight if we’re attacked. If someone attacks us, then it isn’t a foreign war.”
In December 1940 Roosevelt asserted that England was America’s first line of defense. Since Britain needed supplies to help protect American security, the simplest solution was to lease the materials. According to Robert A. Divine, the passage of the Lend-Lease Bill in March 1941 was a major turning point in American foreign policy. The U.S. was firmly committed to the goal of defeating Germany. President Roosevelt gave permission to British and American military staff members to meet during January through March 1941 in order to coordinate military strategy in the event the U.S. entered war against Germany. They determined that Germany was to be first defeated, while the U.S. would stand on the defensive toward Japan in the Pacific.
The Hemisphere Neutrality Belt (300 miles out into the Atlantic), which was established in October 1939, was extended by April 1941 to the 25° Meridian, approximately the half-point line in the Atlantic between Europe and America. Even though the agreement was secret, this line cut into Germany’s announced submarine warfare zone (March 1941).
The Danish government-in-exile placed Greenland under U.S. protection and authorized the construction of air and naval bases there.
Roosevelt’s policy was that American warships were not to shoot at German submarines, and therefore no convoy duty for American warships would be allowed.
To help China, Colonel Claire L. Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” were organized with 50 American airplanes, and de-commissioned American aviators-officers were sent to China.
From December 1940 on, additional materials were placed weekly on the embargo list for Japan, and thereby an economic sanction policy was in force, except for oil. Denying oil to Japan would have brought about dire consequences.
IV. The final plunge into the war.
After Russia was attacked by Germany in June 1941, President Roosevelt stated, “We are going to give all the aid we possibly can to Russia.” He added that the U.S. would give forty million dollars worth of goods and the use of American ships. (The 40 million dollars were Russian assets that were frozen.) Roosevelt did not intend to invoke the Neutrality Act for the Russo-German war. He did not launch any immediate program to assist Russia in spite of his earlier remarks.
On July 1, 1941, the U.S. and Iceland reached an agreement to allow 4,000 marines to be sent to Iceland to forestall a German invasion.
By August 1941, the U.S. gave Russia its first formal commitment of assistance.
Even though the U.S. was neutral, Roosevelt met Churchill off the coast of Newfoundland on a British warship. He resisted Churchill’s efforts to make him declare a warning to Japan that their continued aggression in Asia would bring war with the U.S.A.
The Atlantic Charter was drawn up by Churchill and Roosevelt with the following statement of principles, among them:
1.
|
a pledge against aggression.
|
2.
|
a promise of self-determination in territorial changes.
|
3.
|
respect for the right of self-government and freedom of speech.
|
4.
|
a creation of an effective international organization. (Roosevelt rejected it.)
|
On July 26, 1941, the United States declared a full-scale embargo ending all trade with Japan. Great Britain and her Dominions and the Dutch authorities did the same. It was disastrous for Japan.
In September 1941 the Japanese asked for a summit meeting between the Prime Minister Price Konoye and Roosevelt. Konoye hoped to get American approval of Japanese dominance in the Far East. The United States insisted that Japan give up the New Order in Asia and to withdraw troops from China and Indochina. This insistence of America ended the last chance for diplomatic accommodation between Japan and the U.S. in 1941. Konoye’s government fell from power on October 16, 1941. General Hideki Tojo formed a new cabinet. He pledged to fulfill Japan’s destiny in Asia.
The Japanese attack upon the American gunboat
Greer
in China brought about Roosevelt’s reply that American warships would escort merchant marine ships and would get orders to “shoot-on-sight.”
By November 7, 1941, Roosevelt got the Senate to vote for arming merchant ships.
According to Robert Divine, Roosevelt surrendered the decision for war to Tojo and Hitler.
On November 1, 1941, Tojo decided to have one more month of negotiations with the American government. If these failed, preparations for wars with America, England, and the Netherlands were to be completed by early December.
Roosevelt’s position was that Japan could continue its war with China, but could not move southward toward Thailand and the 100° Meridian, for such a move would result in a war with the United States. The American breaking of the Japanese secret code made Secretary of State Cordell Hull aware that if no agreement was reached by November 29, 1941, “things are automatically going to happen.”
American response to Japan was a 10-point reply, giving the same demands which Japan could not accept. Tojo and his cabinet met with the Emperor on December 1, 1941. Japan decided on war.
After Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, Congress passed a Declaration of War on Japan. Later, on December 11, 1941, Germany declared war on the U.S.A. So did Italy. On the same day, Congress adopted a resolution recognizing a state of war with them.
A teacher could bring to the attention of the students a controversy that arose during the early part of World War II. Was the concentration of our Navy (more than 70 ships) at Pearl Harbor a deliberate act to draw the Japanese to attack it? The Americans had broken the Japanese secret code and were aware that the Japanese were preparing to go to war against the U.S.A. With all the knowledge of the Japanese diplomatic moves, could there not have been a way found to keep the U.S. out of war?